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ordinary witness o such as insanity," lack of knowledge, 12 self-
serving declarations,' 3 prior commission of a felony, 14 failure to un-
derstand questions 15 and disbelief in God.' 6
The declaration is to be restricted to a statement of the cause
of death and the attending circumstances, the res gestae Y1 It must
contain definite -s facts,19 to which the declarant could testify if
alive 2 0 not opinions and conjectures.2 '
Although originally applicable to all types of cases, the use of
this exception to the Hearsay Rule, in the 18th century was restricted
to criminal cases, 22 and later by statute was applied in indictments
for abortion.23  The constitutional right of the accused to be con-
fronted with his accuser has been held not to have been violated by
the use of dying declarations; that the deceased is not a witness with-
in the meaning of the constitution, and it is sufficient if the witness
who testifies as to the declaration is present.
2 4
C. T. S.
ACTIONS--HusBAND'S RIGHT OF ACTION FOR Loss OF WIFE'S
CONSORTIUM AGAINST VENDOR WHO SOLD HER CONTAMINATED
FOOD.-The vendor sold to the plaintiff wife a quantity of crabmeat,
which proved to be contaminated and the plaintiff wife became ill
from the consumption thereof. The wife and her husband brought
concurrent actions against the vendor, the wife for breach of implied
"03 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (2d ed.) §1445.
'Lipcomb v. State, - Miss. -, 22 So. 188 (1897); Reeves v. State,
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" State v. Razell, - Mo. -, 225 S. W. 931 (1920).
' People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 (1874); People v. Smith, supra note 2;
Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. 370 (N. Y. 1886) ; Walton v. State, - Miss. -,
126 So. 29 (1930); State v. Colvin, supra note 8.
" Odum v. State, 13 Ga. App. 687, 79 S. E. 858 (1913); Castillo v. State,
- Tex. -, 69 S. W. 517 (1902).
"Berry v. State, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 1038 (1897); People v. Shaw,
63 N. Y. 36 (1897) ; People v. Falleto, supra note 2.
People v. Shaw, Berry v. State, both supra note 19.
"Brotherton v. People, supra note 2; People v. Smith, supra note 2;
People v. Falleto, supra note 2; Maine v. People, 9 Hun 113 (N. Y. 1876);
Jones v. State, supra note 12; Berry v. State, supra note 19.
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RECENT DECISIONS
warranty of merchantable quality and fitness for human consumption
of the food sold and the husband for damages for the loss of con-
sortium resulting from the illness of the wife. Held, both husband
and wife are entitled to recovery against the vendor, there being, as
to the vendee wife, a warranty of merchantable quality implied, and,
as to the husband, a duty on the part of the vendor growing out of
the warranty which the latter had breached. The lack of privity of
contract between the husband and the vendor does not prevent the
husband's recovery. Gimenez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
and Mitsui Co., - App. Div. -, 269 N. Y. Supp. 463 (2d Dept.
1934).
The vendor of food impliedly warrants to the purchaser that
the goods are both fit for use and of merchantable quality.' At com-
mon law the manufacturer or grower was liable and not the dealer,
2
but this rule has been changed by statute.3 The wife, as purchaser,
could not have recovered in her own right if she had bought the
goods for family use, since then she would have been the agent of
her husband and would not have been in privity of contract with the
vendor.4 But if her agency in such a case had been unknown to the
dealer, the reverse would be true.5 But in the instant case the wife
bought the goods for her own use, and the privity of contract element
is therefore present.
Recovery by the husband of the purchaser against the dealer for
loss of consortium, in spite of there being no privity of contract
between them, seems to rest on the proposition that the actions of
both husband and wife, while based on the contract of warranty,
sound in tort. There are many actions of a like nature, where the
omission to perfect a contract obligation is tortious because it is a
breach of a legal duty.6 Sometimes it is the breach of contract itself
'N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW (1911) 96, subds. 1, 2; Rothmiller v. Stein, 143
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344, 144 N. E. 635 (1924); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y.
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Ayres Co., 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 42Z (1896) ; Bierman v. City Mills Co.,
151 N. Y. 482, 45 N. E. 856 (1897); Howard Iron Works v. Buffalo Elevating
Co., 188 N. Y. 619, 81 N. E. 1162 (1907); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery
Stores, supra note 1.
IN. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW, supra note 1.
"Smith v. Hanson, 228 App. Div. 634, 238 N. Y. Supp. 86 (3rd Dept.
1929); Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk Co., 133 Misc. 556, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 299 (1927).
Meyer v. Kerschbaum, 133 Misc. 330, 232 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1928).
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wherein lies the tortious nature,7 and sometimes it is in the manner
in which the breach is accomplished.8 The action for breach of
warranty itself formerly sounded purely in tort.9 Later warranty
came to be treated as contractual in nature, although the history of
the change is not clear.10 Therefore, if the damages which the hus-
band was seeking to recover arose from his consumption of the food,
lack of privity of contract would have prevented his recovery." But
since the damages are loss of consortium, sounding in tort, and for
which the husband has a cause of action,' 2 he is not barred from
recovery for any lack of privity of contract.
J. R. O'D.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTABLE AND CONTRIBUTORY.-In an action
brought to recover for wrongful death of her husband and for per-
sonal injuries to herself, due to the negligence of the defendants,
the negligence of the defendants in operating the railroad train and
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's intestate in operating
his automobile being conceded, held, no recovery for death of hus-
band; but judgment for wife because negligence of driver is not
imputable to passenger in same vehicle. Miller v. Union Pacific
R. R. Co., - U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 172 (1934).
A driver of an automobile is guilty of contributory negligence
where he is familiar with the crossing and the train was in plain
view at the time of the accident.' The doctrine that the negligence
of the driver of a vehicle is imputed to a passenger, however, was
never accepted in this state, and, after full consideration, distinctly
repudiated.2 Whether a person in a conveyance but having no con-
1Supra note 2.
8 Rich v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 87 N. Y. 382
(1882).
9 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §195, p. 373.
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223 App. Div. 182 (3rd Dept. 1928).
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v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17 (1889) ; Lagergren v. National Coke &
Coal Co., 132 App. Div. 912, 117 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1909); Schaupp v. Turner,
188 App. Div. 338, 177 N. Y. Supp. 132 (3rd Dept. 1919); London v. Cunning-
ham, 1 Misc. 408, 20 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1892); Lyons v. N. Y. City Railway
Co., 49 Misc. 517, 97 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1906); 1 COOLEY, TORTS (3rd ed.
1906) 470.
'Chicago, R. I. & P. Railroad Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697 (1887);
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379, 19 Sup. Ct. 769 (1899).
'Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (1886) ; Union Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174 (C. C. A. 8th, 1892).
